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DIMINISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
OF NEWSRACKS: CITY OF LAKEWOOD V.
PLAIN DEALER PUBLISHING CO.,
108 S. CT. 2138 (1988)
The first amendment' protects the distribution of newspapers2
through newsracks.' Municipalities, however, have attempted to im-
pose arbitrary controls and bans on the placement of newsracks.4
Though municipalities have used governmental interests to justify the
control of newsracks,5 in analogous situations implicating the first
I. U.S. CONST. amend. I states, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." It has been noted that "[a]djustment
of the inevitable conflict between free speech and other interests is a problem as persis-
tent as it is perplexing." Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 275 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring in result). For an analysis of these tensions in the years before the adop-
tion of the Constitution, see P. Kurland, The Original Understanding of the Freedom of
the Press Provision of the First Amendment, 55 Miss. L.J. 225 (1985).
2. "Liberty of circulating is as essential to [freedom of expression] as liberty of pub-
lishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value." Ex
Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).
3. The semi-automatic newsrack, also known as a newspaper vending machine or
newsbox, was invented in 1957. It consists of a coin mechanism and a pull-down door,
which when opened exposes a stack of newspapers. The newsrack replaced the so-
called "honor rack," which only required voluntary payment, and thus left the newspa-
pers bare to easy theft. It's the 30th Birthday of Coin Operated Newsracks, PRESSTIME,
Feb. 1987, at 32.
4. See Boe v. Colello, 438 F. Supp. 145 (S.D. N.Y. 1977) (the town clerk's unbridled
licensing discretion over the right to sell newspapers is an infringement of first amend-
ment rights). For an overview of newsrack cases before 1985, see P. Ball, Extral Ex-
tra! Read All About It: First Amendment Problems in the Regulation of Coin-Operated
Newspaper Vending Machines, 19 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 183 (1985). See infra
notes 74-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of newsrack cases.
5. For example, in regulating newspapers: Rubin v. City of Berwyn, 553 F. Supp.
476 (N.D. I11. 1982) (sidewalk obstruction); Passaic Daily News v. Clifton, 200 N.J.
Super. 468, 491 A.2d 808 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (regulation of roadside signs);
City of Fredonia v. Chanute Tribune, 7 Kan. App. 2d 65, 638 P.2d 347 (1981) (litter-
ing); H & L Messengers, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 577 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn. 1979)
(preventing the indication of vacant property); Carl v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal.
App. 3d 265, 132 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1976) (obscenity). For a discussion on how traffic
regulations can be used, see Note, Traffic Regulations Cannot Unduly Curtail the Free
Speech Right to Circulate Publications, 13 TEx. TECH L. Rnv. 1512 (1982). For an
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amendment the Supreme Court has allowed reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions6 on expression if such limitations are content-neu-
tral.7 In City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.8 the Supreme
Court held a city ordinance9 facially unconstitutional 0 because the or-
dinance granted a government official discretion over a licensing
scheme with a nexus to a first amendment right.11 The Court decided
such a scheme cannot be content-neutral1 2 but allowed a lower court
ruling to stand which permitted not only a restriction, but a total
argument that the Supreme Court has carried the governmental interests test too far,
see H. Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise of the Aesthetic
State Interest, the Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 HASTINGs L.J. 439 (1986).
6. See, eg., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S.
640 (1980) (state's interest in maintaining orderly movement of a crowd allowed restric-
tion); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (street parades forbidden without a
license). For an overview, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONsTrrU-
TIONAL LAW § 16.47 (3d ed. 1986).
7. See, e.g., Arkansas Writer's Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (state
sales tax imposed on general interest magazines, but exempting religious, professional,
trade and sports magazines held content-based and therefore unconstitutional); Minne-
apolis Star v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (Minnesota ink
and paper tax with $100,000 exemption targets a small group of newspapers and is
therefore unconstitutional).
8. 108 S.Ct. 2138 (1988).
9. In this case, City of Lakewood ordinance 901.181, which read in part:
Applications may be made to and on forms approved by the Mayor for rental
permits allowing the installation of newspaper dispensing devices on public prop-
erty along the streets and thoroughfares within the City respecting newspapers
having general circulation through the city.
The Mayor shall either deny the application, stating the reasons for such denial
or grant said permit subject to the following terms:...
(c) The rental permit shall be granted upon the following conditions:...
(7) Such other terms and conditions deemed necessary and reasonable
by the Mayor.
10. A facial attack is one made before an actual harm occurs:
In the area of freedom of expression it is well established that one has standing to
challenge a statute on the ground that it delegates overly broad licensing discretion
to an administrative office, whether or not [one's] conduct could be proscribed by a
properly drawn statute, and whether or not [one] applied for a license.
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965). See Board of Airport Commissioners v.
Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (facial attack allowed because statute may
cause party to refrain from expression rather than risk prosecution). See generally H.
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
11. 108 S.Ct. at 2152. For a description of the "nexus" test, see infra notes 92-95
and accompanying text.
12. 108 S.Ct. at 2143.
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The City of Lakewood 4 forbade the erection of any structure on
city-owned property.15 As a result, the city denied the Plain Dealer
Publishing Company16 permission to place the publisher's newsracks
on city-owned sidewalks. 7 Plain Dealer brought suit in the District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio. 8 The court held the prohibi-
tion unconstitutional, but delayed entering a permanent injunction in
order to give Lakewood time to amend its ordinances. 9 The city re-
sponded by adopting an elaborate licensing scheme20 which gave the
Mayor discretion to grant or deny annual newsrack permit applica-
tions.2" Choosing not to seek a permit, Plain Dealer amended the com-
plaint in the district court and challenged the new law on its face.22
The district court upheld the new ordinance.23 On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part." The appellate court
found a number of sections of the ordinance unconstitutional,25 includ-
13. 108 S.Ct. at 2152.
14. Lakewood is an older residential community, west of Cleveland, with an area of
5.5 square miles and a population in 1980 of just over 60,000. Plain Dealer Publishing
Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794 F.2d 1139, 1141 (6th Cir. 1986).
15. Section 901.18 of the City of Lakewood ordinances stated: "No person shall
erect or place, or cause to be erected or placed, or permit to remain, any building or
structure of any nature upon any street, lane, alley or public ground within the City."
16. The Plain Dealer daily newspaper is distributed as a publication of general cir-
culation throughout the Cleveland Metropolitan area and Ohio. Generally, Plain
Dealer daily newspaper sales are 77 percent by home delivery through carriers and 80
percent on Sundays by home delivery. The balance of the sales are by single copy
through retail outlets and coin-operated newsboxes, the latter constituting 4.6 to 5.27
percent of total sales. 794 F.2d at 1141.
17. 108 S.Ct. at 2141.
18. Both this and the subsequent district court opinions are unreported.
19. 108 S.Ct. at 2141.
20. See supra note 9 for a description of the licensing scheme.
21. 108 S.Ct. at 2142.
22. Id. "There was evidence at trial that although Plain Dealer made no applica-
tion for a permit, it had intended to place newsracks at eighteen locations in Lakewood,
eight of which were located in residential districts." 794 F.2d at 1143. On facial at-
tacks, see supra note 10.
23. 108 S.Ct. at 2142.
24. 794 F.2d at 1148.
25. 794 F.2d at 1143-6. The court found a review by an Architectural Board and
insurance indemnification requirements were unconstitutional, but these were not con-
sidered in the Supreme Court opinion.
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ing the Mayor's arbitrary authority.2 6 The court noted, however, that
a total ban on newsracks would be constitutional and severable from
the original ordinance.2 7 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the
Mayor's arbitrary authority unconstitutional, and remanded the matter
to determine whether the offending section was severable from the re-
mainder of the ordinance.28
For more than a century, the Supreme Court has recognized the
right to freely distribute printed material as a corollary to the first
amendment right to free expression.2 9 The Court in Hague v. Congress
of Industrial Organizations3 ° first extended this distribution right to the
"public forum."3 1 In dictum, Justice Roberts stated that streets and
parks were a public trust, and access to them for free expression could
not be abridged or denied.3 2 Subsequent Supreme Court cases rein-
forced Justice Roberts' assertion,33 until the Court firmly established
26. See supra note 9 for a description of the Mayor's authority.
27. 794 F.2d at 1147-8. See infra note 78 for a criticism of this holding.
28. 108 S.Ct. at 2152. Of course, the court of appeals had already determined this
issue. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
29. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
30. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
31. Professor Kalven coined this phrase. See H. Kalven, The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Or. REv. 1. The Supreme Court had considered
the public forum issue earlier than Hague, but had rejected it as a concept, holding a
public forum does not exist. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
32. 307 U.S. at 515-16. Justice Roberts stated:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a
citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views
on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but
relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and conven-
ience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of
regulation, be abridged or denied.
Id. It has been noted that instead of the solid endorsement for free access, as a first
glance at this passage would indicate, only those particular areas that have been used
"time out of mind" are accessible. All other publicly-owned property may still be re-
stricted. G. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. Cr. REV. 233,
238-9. See also Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984) (utility poles are not an historically protected public forum).
33. A trio of cases decided shortly after Hague established the dictum as precedent:
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (establishing a balancing approach between the
first amendment and a community's interest, and rejecting the contention that alterna-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/8
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this right of access in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham.34 In Shut-
tlesworth, police arrested a minister for violating a city ordinance when
he led an orderly civil rights march through the public streets.35 The
ordinance arbitrarily allowed the City Commission to grant or deny a
parade permit. 36 The Court cited Hague37 to support the proposition
that access to the streets for picketing may not be wholly denied.38
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association39
recently reinforced the importance of open access to streets and
parks." Justice White established three different public forum catego-
ries,41 the preeminent category being streets and parks.4 2 This forum
requires that a content-based exclusion serve a compelling state interest
and be narrowly drawn.43 All other restrictions must be time, place
and manner limitations" that are content-neutral, 45 leave open ample
alternative channels of communication4 6 and are narrowly tailored to
tive available forums justify a ban); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (time,
place and manner restrictions are the appropriate means to regulate); Jamison v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413 (1943) (naked assertion of title by the state does not justify a ban on speech
on public lands). But cf Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (Court in dictum sug-
gested that an absolute ban on patrolling, marching and picketing in streets and parks
would be permissible).
34. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
35. Id. at 149.
36. Id.
37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text for the Hague passage.
38. 394 U.S. at 152. For a discussion of Shuttlesworth as it relates to administrative
discretion, see infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
39. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
40. This includes sidewalks, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983), but not,
for example, utility poles, Vincent, supra note 32, and state fairs, Heffron, supra note 6.
41. 460 U.S. at 45-6.
42. Id. at 45. The other two are those which the state has opened for expressive
activity, and those which "not by tradition or designation" are a forum for expressive
activity. Id. at 45-6.
43. Id. at 45.
44. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for examples of permissable time, place
and manner limitations.
45. Though the opinion in Plain Dealer does not address the issue, Lakewood's or-
dinance states that permits may be granted only to "newspapers having general circula-
tion throughout the city." Supra note 9. This is content-based discrimination and thus
unconstitutional. See supra note 7.
46. However, the availability of alternative fora of communication may not justify a
regulation. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974). But cf Heffron, supra
note 6 (regulation upheld in part because alternative fora were available). Heffron, how-
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serve a significant governmental interest.47
In a line of authority paralleling this development of free admission
to public fora,48 the Supreme Court has also imposed a limitation on
the government's arbitrary power to license access to streets and parks.
Though the Court had already articulated the general concept of prior
restraint,49 Lovell v. City of Griffin 50 first linked prior restraint with
arbitrary authority to grant or deny licenses for expression. The
Court emphasized that a discretionary licensing scheme without time,
place or manner restrictions would establish an unacceptable system of
censorship.52
The Supreme Court restricted this holding in Cox v. New Hamp-
shire,53 where it addressed a municipal ordinance requiring licenses for
parades.54 The New Hampshire Supreme Court had interpreted a
vague city ordinance as implicitly establishing a standard of comfort
and convenience in the use of city streets.55 Unlike in Lovell,56 the
Court weakened its stance by holding that the ordinance was a permis-
sible time, place and manner restriction because the ordinance, as cre-
ever, involved expression in Perry's "second category" forum, one that had been opened
for expressive activity.
47. 460 U.S. at 45. It is important to note that these are conjunctive requirements,
not alternative ones. See Providence Journal Co. v. City of Newport, 665 F. Supp. 107,
117 (D. R.I. 1987).
48. See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of free admission
to public fora.
49. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (193 1). For a history of prior restraint, see D.
Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REv. 429,439-44 (1983);
T. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 650-2
(1955).
50. 303 U.S. 444 (1938). In Lovell, the appellant was convicted of violating a city
ordinance which forbade the distribution of circulars without written permission from
the City Manager. No standards were set to grant or deny permission.
51. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes, in speaking of the power of the
licensor, said: "While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be
regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a
leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision." 303 U.S. at 451-2.
52. 303 U.S. at 452.
53. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
54. In Cox, the appellants were Jehovah's Witnesses who had occupied the street in
a loose procession. "The marchers interfered with the normal sidewalk travel, but no
technical breach of the peace occurred." They were convicted of not acquiring a parade
permit. 312 U.S. at 572-3.
55. Id.
56. See supra notes 50-2 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lovell.
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ated, set a standard-albeit one given it by the state supreme court.57
A comparison of Saia v. New York 5 and Kovacs v. Cooper,59 decided
in successive terms, illustrates the Court's renewed hostility to arbi-
trary licensing schemes. Both involved similar ordinances regulating
sound amplification devices." The ordinance in Saia required a li-
cense, arbitrarily granted or denied by a city official, for the use of a
sound amplifier.61 The Kovacs ordinance placed a total ban on the use
of sound amplifiers. 6 2 The Court63 characterized the difference as a
prior restraint in Saia's discretionary licensing, versus the legitimate
exercise of the state's authority to prevent disturbing noises in Kovac's
prohibition." The Court struck down the Saia ordinance,65 but up-
held the Kovacs ordinance.66
In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,67 the Court faced another
discretionary licensing scheme that the state supreme court, as in
Cox, 68 had given a narrow construction. 69 The Court recognized that
without this limiting construction the ordinance would be facially un-
constitutional 7 0 Significantly, the Court ruled that despite the limita-
tion, Birmingham had arbitrarily administered the ordinance, making
57. "[T]he state court considered and defined the duty of the licensing authority and
the rights of the appellants to a license for their parade, with regard only to considera-
tions of time, place and manner so as to conserve the public convenience." 312 U.S. at
575-6. Even though the original ordinance was similar to the one in Lovell, the Cox
court felt the construction given by the state court was sufficient. Id. at 577.
58. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
59. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
60. 334 U.S. at 558; 336 U.S. at 78. The only difference between the devices was
that in Kovacs the amplification device had to be mounted on a vehicle.
61. 334 U.S. at 558. The appellant in Saia, a Jehovah's Witness, had been granted a
permit, but upon reapplication was refused due to public complaints.
62. 336 U.S. at 78. The system in this case was used to comment on a labor dispute.
63. Though Kovacs was a plurality opinion, it is generally considered authoritative.
See Plain Dealer, supra note 8, at 2148 n.9.
64. 336 U.S. at 82-3.
65. 334 U.S. at 562.
66. 336 U.S. at 89.
67. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
68. See supra notes 53-7 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cox.
69. 394 U.S. at 153-4. The Alabama Supreme Court stated that applications "for
permits to parade must be granted if, after an investigation it is found that the conven-
ience of the public in the use of the streets or sidewalks would not thereby be unduly
disturbed." 281 Ala. 542, 546, 206 So. 2d 348, 352 (1967).
70. 394 U.S. at 150-3.
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the licensing system unconstitutional.7 '
Although a total prohibition of first amendment-protected activities
must conform to Court-imposed restrictions, 72 controversy continues
over whether an arbitrary licensing scheme is a fundamentally greater
denial of first amendment freedoms than a content-blind ban.73
The merger of these two principles, public forum availability74 and
the denial of arbitrary municipal authority over the public forum, 75 has
led, since 1972,76 to almost thirty reported decisions on challenges to
newsrack ordinances. 7 With one exception, no court has upheld a to-
71. Id. at 155-9. It is interesting to note that while there is obviously no evidence
Lakewood's ordinance has been applied in a discriminatory manner-it was challenged
as soon as it was implemented-other newsrack ordinances have been unfairly used.
See Rubin v. City of Berwyn, 553 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
72. Of course, a ban cannot be overbroad. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying
text. See also Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S.
569 (1987) (resolution banning "all first amendment activities" in airport terminal over-
broad and therefore unconstitutional). Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972), presents a useful distinction in what the Court finds overbroad. In Grayned, the
Court held overbroad an ordinance that forbade picketing within 150 feet of a school
building (excepting school labor disputes), but allowed an ordinance forbidding noises
while adjacent to a school building that disturbs the "peace or good order" of school
sessions, because the noise ordinance "punishes only conduct which disrupts or is about
to disrupt normal school activities."
73. Compare Secretary of State of Maryland v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947
(1984) (discretionary waiver provision of statute limiting charitable fundraising ex-
penses is unconstitutional) and Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (authority
to refuse or deny permit for solicitation of members, being discretionary with the Mayor
and City Council, is unconstitutional) with Heffron, supra note 6 (banning activities at
state fair except at specific places is a reasonable time, place and manner restriction and
therefore constitutional) and Vincent, supra note 32 (prohibiting the posting of signs on
utility poles advances a legitimate governmental interest and is therefore constitutional).
74. See supra notes 30-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of public forum
availability.
75. See supra notes 49-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of arbitrary mu-
nicipal control.
76. Gannett v. City of Rochester, 69 Misc. 2d 619, 330 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1972).
77. Cases published before the Court's decision in Plain Dealer are: Jacobsen v.
U.S. Postal Service, 812 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1987); Gannett v. White, 14 Med. L. Rptr.
2037 (N.D. N.Y. 1987); Providence Journal Co. v. Newport, 665 F. Supp. 107 (D. R.I.
1987); City of Burlington v. N.Y. Times, 198 Vt. 275, 532 A.2d 562 (1987), aff'g 12
Med. L. Rptr. 1454 (Dist. Ct. of Vt. 1985); Duffy v. City of Arcadia, 195 Cal. App. 3d
308, 243 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1987); Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794
F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1986); News Printing Co. v. Totowa, 211 N.J. Super. 121, 511 A.2d
139 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986); New York City v. American School Publications,
119 A.D.2d 13, 505 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1986); Passaic Daily News v. Clifton, 200 N.J.
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tal ban on newsracks as constitutional,78 and most courts have struck
down attempts to regulate newsracks as being too broad to serve a
compelling government interest.79  The imaginative powers of munici-
palities in creating a wide variety of ordinances to regulate newsracks,
combined with few higher court opinions, complicates analysis80 The
only two state supreme court decisions discussing newsrack ordinances
indicate the narrow drafting that courts have required if an ordinance
is to pass constitutional mandates.
In City of Burlington v. New York Times Co.s" the Vermont Supreme
Court evaluated an ordinance regulating temporary obstructions on
sidewalks.8 2 The ordinance gave the superintendent of streets free
Super. 468, 491 A.2d 808 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985). For a list of cases before
1985, see Ball, supra note 4, at 185 n.14.
78. See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. Newport, 665 F. Supp. 107 (D. R.I. 1987);
Redd v. Davison, 7 Med. L. Rptr. 1142 (E.D. N.Y. 1981); Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Borough of Swarthmore, 381 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The one exception is
the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Plain Dealer. However, its discussion of the needs Lake-
wood must show in order to uphold the ban, see supra notes 41-47, occupied less than a
column in the official reporter. 794 F.2d at 1147. First, the opinion never showed a ban
advanced the asserted government interest. See Providence Journal, 665 F. Supp. at
113-6. Second, the opinion merely asserted the ban was narrowly tailored. See Chicago
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v.City of Wheaton, 697 F. Supp. 1464, 1471 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (ban is not narrowly tailored). Finally, the opinion held the availability of private
outlets provides an alternative forum, a contention specifically rejected by the Supreme
Court. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (the availa-
bility of a private theater would not justify a city's refusal to allow the performance of
the musical play "Hair" in its municipal theater). Of the four needs Perry outlined to
justify a total ban, see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text, the Sixth Circuit satis-
fied only one.
It has been suggested that the reasoning of Vincent, supra note 32, might justify a
total ban. See Ball, supra note 4, at 192 n.58. Vincent, however, distinguished streets
and parks from its holding. 466 U.S. at 813.
79. See, eg., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallandale, 734 F.2d 666
(1 th Cir. 1984); City of Burlington, supra note 77. But cf Kash Enterprises v. City of
Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 3d 294, 562 P.2d 1302, 138 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1977) (newsrack ordi-
nance sufficiently narrow, but struck down on other grounds).
80. Ball, supra note 4, at 186. There have only been three circuit court opinions,
and two state supreme court opinions. See id., and supra note 77 (listing these
decisions).
81. 148 Vt. 275, 532 A.2d 562 (1987).
82. Section 27-31 of the Burlington Code of Ordinances reads:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to temporarily obstruct
a street or sidewalk without first obtaining a written permit therefor from the su-
perintendent of streets, except as hereinafter provided...
(b) "Obstruction" as used in this section includes, but is not limited to, temporary
obstacles and/or barriers which hinder the free and safe passage of pedestrians and
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choice in determining whether to grant a license for any structure that
hindered movement on the sidewalk. 3 The Vermont Supreme Court
held that arbitrary power vested in a government official cannot be a
valid time, place and manner regulation.84 Such discretion may sup-
press particular points of view by discriminating against licensees based
on what the licensee intends to say.85
In Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 86 however, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court examined an ordinance that definitely and nar-
rowly regulated the placement of newsracks on city sidewalks.8 7 The
court characterized one provision of the ordinance, for example, as
simply requiring that newsracks be positioned to minimize interference
with the city's sidewalk cleaning machinery. 8 Consequently, the court
upheld the ordinance as a reasonable time, place and manner
restriction. 9
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.9° provided the
Supreme Court its first opportunity to discuss newsrack regulations.9"
Writing for a slim majority,92 Justice Brennan analyzed whether the
vehicles, or which may receive injury or damage, if run over or into by pedestrian
or vehicle traffic.
83. Id.
84. 148 Vt. at 280-81, 532 A.2d at 564.
85. Id. at 281, 532 P.2d at 564-65 citing Heffron, supra note 6.
86. 19 Cal. 3d 294, 562 P.2d 1302, 138 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1977).
87. Section 42.00, subdivision (f), for example, provided in part:
(3) Any news rack which in whole or in part rests upon, in or over any sidewalk or
parkway, shall comply with the following standards:...
(F) No news rack shall be placed, installed, used or maintained:
1) Within three feet of any marked crosswalk.
2) Within fifteen feet of the curb return of any unmarked crosswalk.
3) Within three feet of any fire hydrant, fire call box....
6) Within three feet of any bus bench...
and so on. This brief excerpt gives a flavor of the detailed descriptions contained in the
ordinance.
88. 19 Cal. 3d at 304, 562 P.2d at 1308, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
89. The ordinance was ultimately held unconstitutional, however, because one sec-
tion authorized the unlawful seizure of newsracks. Id at 313, 562 P.2d at 1314, 138
Cal. Rptr. at 65.
90. 108 S.Ct. 2138 (1988).
91. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of previous news-
rack cases.
92. The Court divided 4-3. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Black-
mun and Scalia. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices
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ordinance permitted a facial attack,93 and confirmed that unbridled
discretion vested in a government official can result in prior restraint.94
As a result, the Court created a test to evaluate the permissibility of a
facial attack on a statute and, by implication, a determination whether
the statute is presumptively unconstitutional. The Court held that if a
licensing law with a "nexus to expression" gives discretionary power to
a government official, the Court will allow the challenge.95
Justice Brennan argued that the crucial issue was the discretionary
licensing scheme, not whether the city had the power to ban news-
racks. 96 Comparing Saia and Kovacs,97 Justice Brennan stressed that
the arbitrary licensing ordinance by itself was unconstitutional on its
face, even if the city could ban newsracks.98 The Court, therefore,
chose not to decide whether a ban of newsracks would be constitu-
tional.99 Concluding that unrestricted discretion to deny a permit was
unconstitutional, the Court remanded the case for a determination of
whether this part of the ordinance was severable."
The dissent first established that the Court could strike down discre-
tionary licensing only if newsracks were entitled to first amendment
protection.1 0 1 The dissent further argued that newsracks, by occupy-
ing a piece of sidewalk, amount to a taking of public property.10 2 The
Stevens and O'Connor. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy did not
participate.
93. See supra note 10 for a discussion of facial attacks.
94. 108 S.Ct. at 2143.
95. Id. at 2145. The Court characterized the nexus test as follows:
In contrast to the type of law at issue in this case, laws of general application
that are not aimed at conduct commonly associated with expression and do not
permit licensing determinations to be made on the basis of ongoing expression or
the words about to be spoken, carry with them little danger of censorship. For
example, a law requiring building permits is rarely effective as a means of
censorship.
Id. at 2146.
96. 108 S.Ct. at 2147.
97. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of Saia and
Kovacs.
98. 108 S.Ct. at 2149.
99. Id. at 2147 n.7.
100. Id. at 2142.
101. Id. at 2155 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent characterized this as the
"Lovell-Freedman doctrine." For a discussion of Lovell, see supra notes 50-2 and ac-
companying text. Freedman is discussed briefly in supra note 10.
102. 108 S.Ct. at 2155-57. The dissent charged that by allowing this taking, the
state was "subsidizing" the newspaper's first amendment rights.
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first amendment does not obligate the state to allow such a taking;
therefore, no restraint of freedom and no first amendment sanction ex-
ists."' 3 In justifying the regulation the dissent identified a variety of
governmental interests that the state intended the ordinance to
protect. '04
Plain Dealer, in its analysis of arbitrary discretion,10 5 correctly ap-
plied precedent10 6 to invalidate a part of Lakewood's newsrack ordi-
nance.' 0 7  Since Lovell,"°8 the Court has justifiably struck down
unchecked licensing power over expressive activities."° Lower courts
have consistently applied this standard to newsrack schemes. 110
The Court's remand in Plain Dealer,"' however, is potentially more
ominous. The lower appellate court already had found a total ban on
newsracks in Lakewood was both constitutional and severable from the
stricken section,' 12 and the Plain Dealer remand allows this judgement
to stand unchallenged." 3 Permitting the ban is contrary to every other
court judgement.. 4 and inconsistent with prior constitutional princi-
ples on the public forum.' 1 5
By refusing to address the issue directly, 1 6 the Supreme Court pro-
103. Id. The Court has rejected the right to a subsidy for first amendment activities
in the past. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)
(Congress is not required by the first amendment to subsidize lobbying through the tax
code).
104. 108 S.Ct. at 2157-8. The interests the dissent identifies are free access for the
public, safety and aesthetics.
105. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text for a description of the Court's
analysis.
106. See supra notes 49-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's
prior treatment of arbitrary discretion.
107. See supra note 9 for Lakewood's ordinance.
108. See supra notes 50-2 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lovell.
109. See supra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text describing the prior treatment of
newsracks.
111. See supra note 28.
112. See supra note 27.
113. The Supreme Court specifically did not rule on the constitutionality of a total
ban. See supra text accompanying note 99.
114. See supra note 78 for a sampling of these court judgments.
115. See supra notes 30-47 and accompanying text for a description of public forum
principles.
116. Federal courts, of course, have a duty to avoid constitutional issues that need
not be resolved in order to determine the rights of the parties in the case under consider-
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vided little guidance and allowed a newsrack ban to stand, ratifying the
placement of newsracks in a first amendment purgatory.1 17 At its first
opportunity, the Court should clearly protect newsracks from legisla-
tive prohibitions.
David C. Knieriem *
ation. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979). Strictly
speaking, this is what the Court has done in Plain Dealer. However, the impact of the
decision in real terms obviously extends to the foregone results of the remand. See
Chicago Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. City of Wheaton, 697 F. Supp. 1464, 1472 (N.D.
Ii. 1988) (to preserve judicial resources and guide municipality in revising ordinance,
court went beyond what was necessary to rule ordinance unconstitutional).
117. Lakewood amended its ordinance after the remand. Permits may now only be
denied for cause and after notice and hearing. City of Lakewood Ordinance No. 91-88
(1989). The mayor may still deny permits, though, "at any location where the Mayor
determines that such placement would cause an undue safety or health hazard or un-
duly interfere with the right of the public to the proper use of the streets and
throughfares [sic] .... " Id.
The review by the Architectural Board of Review, the indemnification requirements,
and the limitation to "newspapers having general circulation throughout the city" are
still mandated by the ordinance. Id.
* J.D. 1990, Washington University.
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